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Reaching-for-yield—investors’ propensity to buy riskier assets in order to achieve higher yields—is 
believed to be an important factor contributing to the credit cycle. This paper presents a detailed study of 
this phenomenon in the corporate bond market. We show that insurance companies, the largest 
institutional holders of corporate bonds, reach for yield in choosing their investments. Consistent with 
lower rated bonds bearing higher capital requirement, insurance firms’ prefer to hold higher rated bonds. 
However, conditional on credit ratings, insurance portfolios are systematically biased toward higher yield, 
higher CDS bonds. Reaching-for-yield exists both in the primary and the secondary market, and is robust 
to a series of bond and issuer controls, including bond liquidity and duration, and issuer fixed effects. 
This behavior is related to the business cycle, being most pronounced during economic expansions. It is 
also more pronounced for firms with poor corporate governance and for which regulatory capital 
requirement is more binding. A comparison of the ex-post performance of bonds acquired by insurance 
companies shows no outperformance, but higher systematic risk and volatility.  
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A key principle of finance is that in equilibrium there is a positive relation between the risk of an 
asset and its expected return. Comparisons of returns, therefore, are only meaningful on a risk-adjusted 
basis. But risk cannot be measured perfectly. This creates an important limitation in the delegation of 
investment decisions. Financial intermediaries and investment managers that are evaluated based on 
imperfect risk metrics face an incentive to buy assets that comply with a set benchmark but are risky on 
other dimensions; in other words, they have an incentive to “reach for yield”.
1  This could lead to excess 
risk taking in financial institutions, a persistent distortion of investments and, potentially, amplification of 
the overall risk in the economy. Indeed, reaching-for-yield is believed to be one of the core factors 
contributing to the buildup of credit that preceded the recent financial crisis (Yellen, 2011 and Rajan, 
2010).
2  Yet there is lack of clear empirical evidence on this phenomenon. This paper provides an 
economically important example of reaching-for-yield and connects it to investment decisions and 
incentives. 
Reaching-for-yield is a broad phenomenon that is not limited to any specific asset class, but it is 
likely be more pronounced for illiquid and complex securities for which risk measurement is particularly 
problematic. In this paper, we study reaching-for-yield in the context of corporate bonds. The risk of 
corporate bonds and fixed income more generally is often assessed using credit ratings. The advantage of 
credit ratings as a risk measure is that—due to standardized and well-established scales—they are 
comprehensible and have broad coverage for many fixed income securities.  Ratings are also not affected 
by liquidity or market conditions. Not surprisingly, ratings are commonly used for contracting and 
regulation purposes. However, ratings tend to be updated slowly (Cornaggia and Cornaggia, 2011) and 
depend on accuracy of rating methodology and absence of agency conflicts (Becker and Milbourn, 
                                                      
 
1 Cox (1967) used the term “reaching for yield” to describe banks’ tendency to lend to high risk borrowers as a way 
of increasing the promised yield. In this paper, we use this term in a broader sense to describe investors’ preference 
for assets with higher returns.  




3  Given the discrepancy between credit ratings and market perception of risk, reaching-for yield by 
fixed income investors evaluated and/or regulated based on credit ratings should show up conditional on 
such risk benchmark.  
We focus on insurance companies, the largest institutional holder of corporate and foreign bonds. 
According to the U.S. Flow of Funds Accounts, in 2010, their holdings represented $2.3 trillion, or more 
than bond holdings of mutual and pension funds taken together.
4 Regulation requires insurance companies 
to maintain minimum levels of capital on a risk-adjusted basis, often called “RBC” or risk-based capital. 
(On average, 91% of all securities holdings by insurance companies are in fixed income (Nissim, 2010) 
making the treatment of fixed income the core component of the RBC calculation.) To determine the 
capital requirement for credit risk, corporate bonds are sorted into six broad categories (National 
Association of Insurance Commissioners, “NAIC”, risk categories 1 through 6) based on their credit 
ratings, with higher categories subject to higher capital requirement.  
To test for reaching-for-yield we need a clear risk benchmark. Due to the portfolio composition, 
the type of regulation and the presence of government guarantees, the insurance industry presents an 
important and clear setting for studying reaching-for-yield. The central hypothesis is that insurance 
companies may attempt to increase the yield in their bond portfolio through taking on extra priced risk, 
while leaving capital requirements unaffected. To test this prediction, we examine promised yields and 
market perceptions of credit risk (as measured by spreads on credit default swaps, CDS) of insurance 
companies’ investments, conditional on NAIC risk categories. The holding data for the analysis comes 
from Lipper eMAXX and covers the 2004:Q1-2010:Q3 period, which we divide it into before and after 
the financial crisis. The data has a comprehensive coverage of quarterly fixed income holdings by 
individual insurance companies, mutual funds and pension funds.  
                                                      
 
3 In particular, several issues have been raised about rating of structured products (e.g., Benmelech and Dlugosz, 
2009).  
4 Investment decisions of insurance companies are also important because, like banks, insurance companies have 
liabilities to a broad population base.  
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Our basic finding for the pre-crisis period is illustrated in Figure 1. In this figure, insurance firms’ 
investment behavior is benchmarked against other investors in our sample. Whereas insurance companies 
face capital requirements imposed by regulators based on credit ratings, this is not the case for mutual and 
pension funds.
5 (This is not to say that mutual and pension funds do not reach for yield, but reaching 
behavior for these institutions would be driven by factors other than credit ratings and, therefore, would 
manifest itself differently.) Figure 1, Panel A shows that, consistent with risk-weighted capital 
requirement, insurance companies exhibit a strong preference for safer bonds. However, just the opposite 
is true within regulatory risk categories (Figure 1, Panel B). For securities rated AAA, AA, A or BBB 
(NAIC risk category 1 and 2) insurance companies hold 63% of all bonds held by insurance companies, 
pension or mutual funds in the lowest yield quartile, but 86% in the highest yield quartile. The result is 
very similar for CDSs.
6 
[FIGURE 1] 
This basic finding is robust to controlling for a set of bond and issuer characteristics, including 
duration, issue size, year of issuance, bond liquidity, and detailed credit rating, so it is unlikely to be 
driven by investor preferences over these characteristics.
7  Also, while Figure 1 looks at the investment 
decisions at issuance; we find similar results using secondary market trading. The secondary market 
setting enables us to focus only on insurance firms and control for issuer-times-quarter fixed effect, ruling 
                                                      
 
5  Although mutual funds and pension funds might explicitly commit to invest all or part of their portfolio in 
investment grade (Chernenko and Sunderam, 2012), they are not evaluated by its investors solely on its compliance 
with the specified mandate. For example, as any funds, fixed income funds available through Fidelity or Vanguard 
offer detailed information on fund risk, including historical standard deviation and market beta. On the other hand, 
even basic statistics like risk adjusted capital of insurance firms are not easily available to the general public, 
reinforcing risk-assessment set by regulators.  
6 An advantage of using CDS spreads in addition to yields is that they may be affected by illiquidity in a different 
way than positive net supply assets like bonds (Bongaerts, De Jong and Driessen 2011). 
7 As Longstaff, Mithal and Neis (2007) suggest, most of the variation in yields across corporate bonds is related to 
credit risk. Thus, it appears unlikely that insurance companies’ high yields are a reflection of liquidity alone. This 
prior based on the bond pricing literature is confirmed in our tests of holdings at issuance: liquidity plays a limited 
role in bond selection.    
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out differences in institutional preferences and bond cross-sectional differences as explanations of our 
results.   
As a contributing factor to credit cycles, reaching-for-yield is believed to be pro-cyclical. There 
are several reasons why reaching may be less attractive during a downturn.  First, downgrade probabilities 
rise during economic recessions, so the ratings of some high risk bonds may be less stable. Reaching-for-
yield could also be curtailed because of increased scrutiny of investment managers (Gennaioli, Shleifer 
and Vishny, 2012), or because lower quality managers become unwilling to take risks they do not 
understand (Gurrieri and Kondor, 2012). Finally, a shift in the riskiness of the environment, or a shift in 
interest-rate regime can make reaching-for-yield less attractive.  We test and confirm predictions about 
cyclicality in reaching for yield behavior. Insurance companies’ propensity to pick high yield, high CDS 
bonds within given NAIC risk category disappears in the second half of 2007 and comes back in the 
second half of 2009.
8   
There might be a concern that the documented investment pattern reflects insurance companies’ 
superior investment ability or access to investment opportunities, i.e., that what seems to be reaching-for-
yield is simply “alpha”.  Note that such an alternative explanation is not trivial as it would need to account 
for the fact that reaching-for-yield is specific only to investment grade bonds and only to the period of 
credit expansion.  Regardless, we directly assess insurance investors’ ability to generate alpha by 
examining bond portfolio returns. Consistent with our conclusions, we find that bonds preferred by the 
insurance companies have lower returns (although significantly so only in some specifications), higher 
volatility in and higher exposure to market returns (beta). This confirms that insurance firms get higher 
yields by assuming risk.
9  
                                                      
 
8  This pattern echoes the changed risk appetite in money market mutual funds at the time, documented by 
Kacperczyk and Schnabl (2012). 
9 We also show that CDS spread is a good predictor of ratings downgrades: within NAIC1, the lowest CDS quartile 
has a 1% probability of a downgrade over the next quarter, but for the highest CDS quartile this probability is 





Why do investors reach for yield?  There are several possible explanations. Capital requirements 
that reflect default risk but not covariances (Iannotta and Pennacchi, 2012), or imperfectly observable 
skill (Gurrieri and Kondor, 2012), can generate an incentive to acquire assets with high systemic risk. 
Rajan (2010) points to the presence of incentives for financial intermediaries to give an appearance of 
superior performance that leads them to take on tail risk (e.g., earthquake insurance) in times when 
financing is plentiful. Investment incentives at the insurance firms—discussed in more detail in the next 
section—are largely consistent with the framework outlines by Rajan (2010); in particular, in absence of 
default, performance is evaluated based on promised yields. Government guarantees for insurance firms 
may also generate risk shifting incentives (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).
10   These are not mutually 
exclusive channels, and they share the common element that investment managers face different 
incentives than owners or regulators, leading to reaching-for-yield.  
An alternative set of explanations implies that reaching-for-yield is a reflection of the preference 
for higher expected returns associated with riskier assets and a desire to offset constraints imposed by 
regulation (often referred to as “regulatory arbitrage”).
11   Private contracting frictions like leverage 
constraints (Frazzini and Pedersen, 2011) could explain ultimate investors’ preference for riskier assets. 
In this setting, there is no conflict with an intermediary who is merely implementing the preferences of 
their investors. There had been some evidence of reaching-for-yield by banks, money market fund, 
structured products, and mutual funds; in all of these cases the reaching-for-yield seems to be triggered 
due to the agency frictions.  Similarly, roughly 70% percent of the insurance companies’ balance sheet is 
insurance policies (the fundamental reason for industries regulation); furthermore, these obligations are 
government guaranteed. It is unclear how reaching-for-yield by insurance firms shown in this paper could 
                                                                                                                                                                           
 
overall frequencies are comparable to what rating agencies provide for historical transition densities (e.g. Moody’s 
Investor Service 2002). 
10 Acharya and Richardson (2009) describe such guarantee-driven risk-shifting in banks. 
11 This is similar to Peltzman’s (1975) “belted-milquetoast-turned-daredevil” effect.  
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be a reflection of insurance-policy holders’ preferences.  Nevertheless, to shed more light on the drivers 
behind reaching-for-yield behavior we look at the cross-section of insurance firms.  
Consistent with risk-shifting, we find that insurance firms for which the capital constraint is more 
binding tend to reach for yield more.  Controlling for regulatory capital constraints, publicly listed firms 
do not appear to reach for yield more than privately held companies. This suggests that earnings 
management or short-run performance pressure—which would appear more important to managers of 
public firms—is unlikely to motivate the observed investment behavior of companies that reach-for-yield. 
However, among public firms, those with better corporate governance show less evidence of reaching-
for-yield. Although these findings are based on data for relatively few firms, it provides support in favor 
of a role for agency frictions.  
In the final set of results we evaluate welfare consequences of reaching-for-yield. We look at two 
channels through which reaching-for-yield could have broader implication for the economy: 
concentration of systemic risk in the insurance firms’ portfolios, the potential effect on the allocation of 
credit supply. First, we examine insurance companies’ stock returns during the 2008.  As documented by 
Koijen and Yogo (2012), insurance companies overall had been adversely affected during the crisis. 
Consistent with reaching for yield being associated with higher risk taking, we find bigger losses of 
equity value for those firms that had reached for yield more in their portfolio.  
To assess the impact of insurance companies investment preferences on credit allocation, we 
compare the issuance of different investment grade bond issuers: those with high CDS spreads (whose 
bonds are favored by insurance companies) and those with low CDS spreads. We track bond issuance 
volumes by these two groups over time, and find that times with high issuance by riskier issuers coincides 
with times of pronounced reaching for yield by insurance firms. This evidence suggests an impact of 
insurance companies’ investment behavior on credit issuance volumes and quality.  
Broadly speaking, our paper is related to the large literature on agency problems in delegated 
investment management, such as Chevalier and Ellison (1999) and to the literature on regulatory design 
(see Pigou (1938) and Laffont and Tirole 1993). However, our focus is on reaching-for-yield. In the  
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context of securitization, several studies have shown evidence of agency-related problems that are 
consistent with reaching-for-yield among investment managers. For example, Keys et al. (2010) show that 
securitization reduces incentives of financial intermediaries to screen borrowers above and beyond a 
specific benchmark. Lax screening may produce the type of high-risk good-rating assets that comply with 
requirements for investors. Indeed, Coval, Jurek and Stafford (2009) show that leading to 2008 senior 
collateralized debt obligation (CDO) tranches appeared to misprice the systematic risk exposures. This 
finding is indicative of investors focusing exclusively on credit ratings, but it focuses on the supply side. 
Our paper provides an explanation for why there might be a demand for such assets. Another difference is 
that we examine corporate bond markets, by far the largest category of non-government fixed income 
securities, for which generalization of findings on structured products is non-trivial.  
The rest of the paper is divided in five sections. Section 1 discusses in deeper detail capital 
requirements and incentives for insurance firms. Section 2 presents the data. Section 3 presents the core 
results. Section 4 evaluates broader implications of reaching-for-yield, and Section 5 concludes.   
 
1.  Insurance companies: Institutional setting 
A.  Capital requirement 
Insurance companies’ investment portfolio size and composition vary substantially depending on 
their main product. There are three main lines of insurance business: (i) life, (ii) property and casualty, 
and (iii) reinsurance. Life insurance companies have the largest assets under management. At the end of 
2010, life insurance total financial assets represented $5,177 billion, as compared to $1,403 billion for 
property and casualty insurance companies (Table I). The core of insurance companies’ financial assets is 
invested in medium- and longer-term fixed-income assets. Nearly 40% of the life insurers’ financial 
assets are invested in corporate and foreign bonds, making them the largest institutional holder of this 
asset class. The precise information on the composition of bond holding by insurance firms is sparse, but 
according to Allstate 2010 annual statement, corporate bonds represented 38% of its overall financial 




Similar to the banks, insurance companies are subject to risk-adjusted capital requirements on 
their investments. Companies that fail to comply with the capital requirement may be taken over by state 
insurance departments.
12  In principle, insurance companies are regulated at the state level. For firms with 
multiple subsidiaries, each subsidiary is subject to state laws and regulations. However, the regulatory 
standards are coordinated through NAIC. As part of this study, we contacted the department of insurance 
in fifty states and received an explanation about state-level regulation of capital from all but three states 
(Georgia, New York and New Jersey). In summary, there is some variation at the state level on statutory 
capital (capital required in order to retain a business license), but every state uses risk-based capital 
weights formulated by NAIC.  
Capital requirements for credit risk are determined as a weighted sum of investments in different 
risk-categories. Capital weights are summarized in Table II; these risk factors had been constant over our 
sample period. Direct obligations of the U.S. government are exempted from capital requirement.  The 
remaining securities are assigned to one of six risk categories (NAIC Category 1 through 6). For bonds, 
NAIC categories are determined based on the credit risk ratings. Issues rated AAA, AA or A are 
classified as Category 1. Each subsequent rating corresponds to a different NAIC risk category. 
Corresponding capital requirement increases exponentially. For each $100 invested in Category 1, the 
insurer has to put $0.30 of equity capital. For Category 2 (BBB), the capital requirement would be $0.96, 
more than three times larger. Similar investment in Category 5 (CCC) would command $16.96 or nearly 
57 times more of equity capital.
13 
                                                      
 
12 Weiss Ratings reports that between 2008-2011 there were 82 insurance companies that were taken over by the 
state regulator (www.weissratings.com/ratings/track-record/insurer-failures.aspx). 
13 In addition to credit risk, total risk-based capital formula includes capital charges for equity risk, interest rate risk, 
affiliated and off-balance sheet risk, and other business risks. Each capital requirement component is computed 
separately. But rather than taking a simple sum of the components, risk-based formula rewards a company for 
diversifying its risks (the discount is often referred to as the “covariance adjustment”).  
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B.  Incentives to reach for yield 
For reaching-for-yield to arise there must be an incentive to maximize returns, conditional on 
compliance with risk benchmark. Capital requirement for insurance companies leads to a target 
distribution of the portfolio by NAIC risk category, with the skew toward investment grade bonds. In fact, 
according to Allstate annual statement, as of the end of 2010, 91.6% of its consolidated fixed income 
securities portfolio was rated investment grade. However, within the NAIC risk category, there is an 
incentive for the insurance firm and investments’ manager to maximize the yield on their investments. For 
example, Allstate, the largest publically held U.S. insurance company, explicitly states in its 2010 report 
to shareholders that: “The return on our investment portfolios is an important component of our financial 
results.” It also specifies that the investment strategy balances “the pursuit of competitive returns” with 
liquidity needs given its overall corporate capital structure.  
It is important to note that promised yields—and not coupon yields, or market values—determine 
earnings for insurance firms. The insurance industry reports financial accounts using both statutory 
accounting principles (SAP) and general agreed accounting principles (GAAP). SAP accounts are 
presented to state insurance commissioners, and may vary slightly by state. GAAP accounts are primarily 
used for filings to the SEC. There is a significant overlap between the two accounting systems in the 
treatment of investment portfolios. Under GAAP, fixed income securities intended to be held to 
maturity—the majority of insurance companies’ bond holdings—are accounted for using the “amortized 
amount”, i.e., the premium or discount at which a bond is bought, relative to its par value, is amortized 
evenly over time (as long as the bond is not in default).
14 Under SAP, all bonds are treated this way. 
Under amortized treatment of bonds, the impact of non-defaulted bonds on insurers’ income is the yield 
to maturity at which the bond was acquired.
15  
                                                      
 
14 An exception to this rule are property and casualty  insurance companies which carry speculative grade corporate 
bonds (NAIC 3-6) at the lower of fair value or cost. 
15 See Myhr and Markham (2004) for more detail on these issues.  
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It is also worth understanding the incentives to reach-for-yield at the manager level. According to 
the Insurance Asset Manager 2010 Annual Survey (World Trade Executive, 2011), in 2006 over 78% (or 
$3.25 trillion) of insurance investments were managed in-house. It is primarily insurance companies with 
assets under $3 billion who outsource their portfolio management. The decision to outsource investments 
also varies by asset class with high-grade corporate portfolio typically managed in-house. (See NAIC, 
2011 for more details.) Compensation of in-house portfolio managers tends to be similar to other asset 
managers: insurance company annual investment management fees for core fixed-income mandates are 
generally in the range of 10 to 25 basis points of assets under management. The investment manager’s 
objective is to outperform the investment target. “If the manager outperforms the index by as much or 
more than the specified margin while meeting the other constraints, the investment manager would be 
considered to have successfully managed the investment portfolio.” (NAIC, 2011)   
2.  Data 
The data for the analysis was compiled from multiple data sources and covers the 2004:Q1-
2010:Q3 period. We have data on bond holdings from Lipper eMAXX. This database has a 
comprehensive coverage of quarterly fixed income holdings for insurance companies, mutual funds and 
pension funds. Insurance companies constitute approximately half of holdings, by number and by dollars, 
throughout our sample. The data contains both manager (e.g., Fidelity) and ultimate investor (e.g., 
Allstate). eMAXX classifies investors into categories based on type (e.g., mutual funds vs. insurance 
companies). The coverage of foreign bond buyers and hedge funds is limited.  eMAXX does not cover 
households, banks, and governments. We also specifically focus on a set of large firms for which CDS 
spread data (see below) is likely to informative and accurate. 
We exclude convertible bonds, preferred stock, other preferred securities, and government or 
government sponsored enterprises’ bonds from our sample. Over the sample period, we observe over 4 
million individual corporate bond holdings in a total of 10,045 bonds. The dollar value of holdings in the 
sample is $336 billion in 2004:Q1, rising to $472 in 2010:Q4, with a reported face value of $1 to $1.4  
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trillion, again depending on the quarter. The fraction of ownership covered by eMAXX is stable over 
time. 
We examine bond holdings by insurance companies at issue as well as their trading by over time. 
Our new issues sample consists of holdings data for 3,709 bonds issued by 320 firms between 2004:Q3 
and 2010:Q4. As illustrated in Figure 2, most of the bond issuance in our sample is investment grade. 
NAIC risk categories1 and 2 include 2,467 issues with a total of $152 billion raised. Issues rated non-
investment grade, NAIC risk categories 3-6, amount to 1,242 issues (half the issue count for investment 
grade) and only a third in term of issue volume.  
[FIGURE 2] 
We collect issuer credit ratings and bond characteristics from Mergent FISD. Ratings are issued 
by S&P, Moody’s or Fitch, and are combined into a single rating for each bond according to NAIC 
rules.
16 That is, if the bond is rated by two rating agencies, we use the lowest rating. If the bond is rated 
by all three rating agencies, we use the middle rating. Ratings are translated to a numerical scale for the 
purpose of averaging. The rating AAA is assigned the value 28, AA+ is 26, AA 25, AA- 24, A+ 23, etc. 
all the way down to CCC- which is 9, CC which is 7 and C which is 4. Table II describes how ratings are 
organized into NAIC categories for the purpose of capital requirements. Because our focus is on yields 
and yields are not reported for floating coupon bonds, we exclude them from the sample. The majority of 
U.S. corporate bonds are fixed coupon bonds, so this is not something that significantly reduces our 
sample. We also collect promised yields at issue from Mergent FISD.  
[TABLE II] 
In tests of bond acquisitions by insurance companies when bonds are first issued, we consider the 
spread between the promised yield to maturity and a matched treasury bond, reported by MergentFISD. 
                                                      
 
16 The NAIC allows ratings from a group raters (these were called acceptable ratings organizations – AROs – until 
2012 when the nomenclature has changed to credit rating providers -- CRPs), For the period studied, this set of 
raters was a subset of the SEC’s nationally recognized statistical ratings organizations (NRSROs), with some 
additional requirements. Moody’s, S&P and Fitch were all AROs the whole period.  
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When MergentFISD does not report a spread, we estimate it using the yield curve implied by other 
spreads reported at the same time and a bond’s yield to maturity.   
We also study bond acquisitions by insurance companies in the secondary market. To track yields 
over time, we employ the Trade Reporting and Compliance Engine (TRACE) database which reports 
dates, yields, prices at which bonds trade. We exclude trades that are canceled or corrected, and when 
multiple similar trades occur very close in time, we discard all but one transaction (assuming it is a pass-
through transaction). For a given bond we calculate the median yield of all transactions taking place on 
the last active trading day in a given month, or quarter. We calculate bond returns as the change in price 
from the end of a month to the end of the next month, adding in the coupon yield. We use time series data 
on several return factors: the value-weighted stock market index and the risk-free rate from Ken French's 
website
17, the difference in returns between investment grade and high yield corporate bonds using the 
Lehman/Barclays index, which we call the default premium, and treasury returns to calculate the term 
spread. We also use the Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) liquidity factor, reported in WRDS.  
CDS spreads—an alternative to yield spreads as a measure of market perceptions of credit risk—
come from Credit Market Analysis, downloaded using Datastream.  A CDS is essentially an insurance 
contract that guarantees the payoff in case a bond defaults. A higher spread — higher cost of insurance — 
is associated with higher default probability. The CDS spread is a quarterly premium (quoted on 
annualized basis) that the CDS buyer pays the seller. In exchange, the seller commits to pay the buyer 
bond’s face value upon bond’s default. We use the data for 5-year senior default spreads, the most liquid 
segment of the market.  In the last ten years, the CDS market has become increasingly important. In 2001 
notional value of CDS market was $630 billion; in 2009, despite retraction of the market, the notional 
                                                      
 
17 Based on Longstaff, Mittal and Neis (2007), some studies have used the swap rate instead of treasury rate as a 
benchmark for returns. We have tried this alternative throughout, with very similar results.  
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amount was $36 trillion.
18 Yet, for most bonds, the CDS market remains illiquid; this is one reason why 
CDS spreads are slow to be adopted in contracts and regulation as a measure of risk. We focus on bond 
issuers that were part of the CDX Markit index, one of the primary tradable index families, between the 
index inception in 2003 and 2010.
19  The inclusion in the index is determined by liquidity rankings, 
constrained so that the index has a balanced industry representation.
20 One thing to keep in mind is that 
CDS is not specific to individual bonds; upon default several fixed income securities might be considered 
to be a deliverable under the contract.   
Table III compares sample bonds across different CDS quartiles. We assign all issuers to CDS 
quartiles, from low to high, among all firms in a ratings group in a given quarter. (In the analysis, we will 
use a continuous measure of CDS spread. In this table, we summarize it by quartiles for purposes of 
expositions.) Quartile 4 (high CDS spreads within NAIC category) bonds are characterized by higher 
yields, but not the longer maturities, than low CDS bonds. The high CDS bonds’ issuers have lower 
ratings, higher book leverage and lower return on assets (and higher CDS spreads, obviously). The size of 
issuers is not statistically different. This is consistent with the CDS spread capturing financial 
performance of the company that might not be fully reflected in the credit ratings.  Table III is conditional 
on investment grade bonds (NAIC category 1 and 2), but as one can see with the exception of the lowest 
CDS quartile, there are no differences in average credit ratings across the CDS categories.  
[TABLE III] 
                                                      
 
18 U.S. Government Accountability Office, “Regulatory Oversight and Recent Initiatives to Address Risk Posed by 
Credit Default Swaps”, testimony before the Subcommittee on Capital Markets, Insurance, and Government 
Sponsored Enterprises. 
19 Conditioning our sample on inclusion in the index at any point during the eight year period might generate a 
selection bias. A bond issued by a firm that is not a member of the CDX index in 2004, but will be included in the 
2009, will appear in our sample. This should not affect the composition of ownership, but might hypothetically 
result in an upward bias for average realized returns on the bonds after issuance. We will not use average returns for 
our tests (but we will compare returns of subgroups). 
20 We include bonds that had been either part of investment grade (CDX.NA.IG) or non-investment grade index 
(CDX.NA.HY), Series 1 through 16.  Series 1 of CDX Markit Index was rolled out in October 2003.  
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We compute two measures of bond liquidity: the log of total transaction volumes relative to 
outstanding par value in the preceding quarter (based on TRACE), and the log of the number of investors 
reporting changed positions in the bond over the preceding quarter (based on eMAXX). We also estimate 
bond durations, based on detailed cash flow (e.g., coupon times and amounts) data from Mergent FISD 
and yields (from Mergent FISD at issue or from eMAXX transactions for later dates). 
Finally, we collect additional information about insurance companies. First, we gather daily stock 
return data for publicly listed insurers for the 2001 to 2011 period from CRSP, and calculate betas and 
volatilities as well as the stock returns during the crisis. The average stock return for the crisis period, 
defined as June 2008 to February 2009, is -46.3% and the standard deviation is 30.6%.  We also collect 
regulatory capital for insurance companies from S&P CapitalIQ. Our measure of regulatory capital 
cushion surplus is the difference between required capital and reported capital, normalized with book 
value of assets. When a subsidiary company appears in our data, we use the ultimate parent’s capital. 
Across 97 parent companies, the mean of 2004 capital surplus is 17% and the standard deviation is 11%.  
To characterize insurers, we also define an indicator for publicly listed firms, and a lagged 
measure of leverage (the ratio of assets to equity) and size (the log of asset book value). Mean leverage is 
8.8 and standard deviation 26.0 (this measure includes policy liabilities). Mean book assets is $70 billion. 
We collect data on governance from Dlugosz, Fahlenbrach, Gompers and Metrick (2006). For each public 
insurance company, we update their block count from 2001 (the last date they provide data for) using   
13-F filings. We use total ownership in block holdings (as a fraction of outstanding shares) as a measure 
of governance. For each insurance company, we calculate the average yield on their investment grade 
portfolio as a measure of the institution’s propensity to reach for yield. To avoid putting excessive weight 
on a few bond positions, we calculate the equal-weighted average treasury spread of each insurer’s pre-
crisis bonds acquisitions in NAIC 1 and 2 (i.e., bonds rated AAA, AA, A and BBB). 
3.  Results 
A.  Benchmark results: Holdings at bonds issuance  
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Our first set of results focuses on investment choices at the bond issuance. As mentioned earlier, 
the core of insurance assets are managed by life insurers. Unlike property and casualty companies, life 
insurers to do not anticipate paying benefits in a short run on their average policy, so most of their 
investments are held to maturity. As a result, insurance portfolios have little turnover. According to NAIC 
(2011), portfolio turnover is in the range of 20 -25% per year or less for the core fixed-income insurers’ 
holdings. That is why looking at investment choices at issuance is central for understanding their 
behavior.  Overall, total new issues in our sample amount to approximately $2 trillion. We have holding 
data on 6,154 bonds of which 3,807 are issued during the 2004:Q3-2010:Q3 sample period. 
We should note that the holding data is quarterly, and we do not observe exact dates when 
holdings have changed.  A large fraction of the bonds appear in insurance companies’ portfolio in the 
quarter immediately following bond issuance helps to ameliorate this problem. Because there is fairly 
little turnover, the bond positions we observe in the first quarter were most likely largely acquired at 
issue. It is very likely that the yield at issuance (as reported in Mergent FISD) is the yield at which bonds 
were acquired.  The reporting date is not standardized for different investors. To allow for reporting 
delays, we have also included bond holdings in the second calendar quarter following the date of bond 
issuance when the first quarter shows no holdings, but this does not change results. 
To test if insurance companies reach for yield by we compare their bond acquisitions to those of 
other institutions. Figure 3 documents the average bond yields in portfolios of insurance, pension funds 
and mutual funds in the pre-crisis period and crisis/post-crisis period, respectively. Comparing both 
mutual funds and pension funds, it’s clear that insurance companies acquired high yield bonds during the 
pre-crisis period. Of course, these comparisons do not control for other factors, and discard all 
heterogeneity in yields. This can be addressed in regressions. 
[FIGURE 3] 
Regression results for bond purchases at issuance are reported in Tables IV (yields) and V (CDS 
spreads). Each observation in the sample corresponds to a different bond. The dependent variable is a sum 
of insurance investors’ holdings of a given bond scaled by the total recorded holdings in the eMAXX  
16 
 
data; insurance companies’ investment decision is benchmarked against aggregate holdings of mutual and 
pension funds. We cluster standard errors by issuer because same companies can have several issues over 
our sample. (In addition, CDS contracts are not specific to the deliverable.)     
Both Table IV and V report results for pre-crisis (2004:Q3-2007:Q2, specifications (1) - (4)) and 
crisis period (2007:Q3-2010:Q4, specifications (5)-(7)).
21  In Table IV the explanatory variable of interest 
is the treasury spread at issuance. Specifications (1)-(3) show that, as compared to other institutional 
investors, the propensity of insurance companies to invest in new bonds is an increasing function of the 
yield. In other words, there is reaching-for-yield.  The first column of Table IV reports the baseline 
regression. The coefficient on the treasury spread is positive and significantly different from zero, 
indicating that in the pre-crisis period, within NAIC 1 and 2, bonds with higher yields ended up with 
insurance investors, more than other bonds. The coefficient estimate implies that a 100 basis point 
increase in the yield (a standard deviation is 128 bps) corresponds to a 7% higher fraction of insurance 
holdings. This corresponds to a quarter of a standard deviation of the dependent variable. 
In specifications (1)-(3), the sample is constrained to bonds rated investment grade at issuance 
(NAIC risk category 1 and 2). Because NAIC 1 and NAIC 2 have different capital treatment, we include a 
dummy variable equal one for bonds rated BBB+, BBB or BBB- (NAIC2) and zero otherwise.  In 
columns (2) and (3) we add controls for bond and issuer characteristics. The concern is that insurance 
companies (or the control investor group) have preferences for certain bond or issuer characteristics. If 
these features are correlated with yield, reaching-for-yield may be hard to distinguish from the investors’ 
preferences. In column (2), we control for bond duration and offering amount. The offering amount 
captures the size of the issue (insurance companies may ignore small issues) and liquidity (larger bond 
                                                      
 
21 Because eMAXX has comprehensive coverage we detect new issues when a bond appears in the data for the first 
time. New issues for 2004:Q1 and 2004:Q2 are difficult to identify from the data because old bonds also appear for 
the first time in these quarters. Hence, the sample starts in 2004:Q3.  
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issues are more liquid).
22 The negative coefficient on issue size is consistent with a tolerance for higher 
liquidity among insurance investors. This is consistent with their long holding periods and investment 
horizons; i.e., it makes sense for insurance investors to hold the least liquid bonds if they can get 
compensated for this. The limited explanatory power of issue size is also consistent with there being 
limited scope to reach for yield by loading up on illiquidity alone (see Longstaff, Mithal and Neis, 2007). 
In column (3), we extend the set of controls to include ratings (AAA, AA, A, BBB) interacted with year 
of the bond issuance.  (The dummy for NAIC 2 drops out in this specification.) Fixed effects absorb a lot 
of the variation in the sample, raising the R-squared from 17% to 31%.  But the coefficient of interest 
remains positive, economically large and statistically significant.  
[TABLE IV] 
Specification (4) is the same as specification (3), but applied to non-investment (speculative) 
grade issues as opposed to investment grade. The coefficient on the yield is now statistically insignificant, 
which is consistent the hypothesis that reaching-for-yield should be less appealing for lower ratings 
(where the probability of downgrades and capital requirements are higher). 
In columns (5) through (7) we repeat the same analysis for the “crisis” period, defined as the 
period following second half of 2007 (2007:Q3-2010:Q4).
23 The idea is to allow for possible changes in 
investment behavior during the financial crisis. Specifically, we expect reaching-for-yield over this period 
to become weaker due to rise in downgrade probabilities, increase in scrutiny, rise in awareness of 
previously neglected risks, or a shift in risk-preferences. The coefficient on yield is reversed during the 
crisis. As discussed in the introduction, during the economic downturn, the incentives to reach for yield 
are likely to be much weaker. This is consistent with the time-varying pattern identified in the data.  This 
                                                      
 
22  In our tests of the secondary market (trades of bonds after issuance), we include explicit controls for bond 
liquidity. 
23 Arguably, the financial crisis was over before this period ends; the National Bureau of Economic Research dates 
the associated economic recession as December 2007 through June 2009. We revisit detailed time pattern below in 
Table VII.  
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finding also helps with the interpretation of our results because it means that time-invariant institutional 
differences—e.g., regulation, superior investment ability, or institutional investment preferences—cannot 
explain our findings.  
The results reported in Table IV imply that insurance companies, relative to other investor 
categories, favor high-yield bonds conditional on the benchmark risk category. This is consistent with 
reaching-for-yield, i.e. a preference for riskier bonds within a given category. We next turn to CDS 
spreads. The market for CDS contracts, on the firms in our sample, is liquid and potentially attracts a 
broader investment base. Therefore, it can provide an informative alternative measure of risk.  
In Table V we repeat the analysis using logarithm of the median CDS spread in the quarter of 
issue as the main explanatory variable.
24 We expect the same sign on spreads as on yields. In all of the 
benchmark specifications, the holdings of insurance companies load positively on the CDS spread. In 
column (1), which presents the baseline results, a one standard deviation increase in the CDS spread (an 
80% increase in the log of the spread) corresponds to a 5.8 percentage point increase in the insurance 
share of holdings at issue. The coefficient estimates are even larger in we include controls for maturity, 
issue size, year of issuance and credit rating (columns 2 and 3). As before, this result only holds for 
investment grade bonds and disappears during the crisis.  
[TABLE V] 
Note, that the yield and CDS spreads are not always available, so the sample sizes differ between 
Table IV and Table V. In Figure 4, we examine the relation between the two variables for all bond issues 
where both are available. The relationship is positive and significant. This helps with the concern that the 
results shown for yields and CDS spreads correspond to different samples of issuers. It also highlights 
                                                      
 
24 In order to have a result in the form of an elasticity, it is convenient to use the log of the CDS spread, and logs 
avoids a disproportionate influence on regression by a few outliers (results are similar with the spread itself).We use 
median across daily observations to account for outliers, but the results are the same using the average spread.  
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that yields and CDS spreads can differ, suggesting that it is a conservative approach to use both as 
measures of risk taking in bond portfolios. 
[FIGURE 4] 
Taken together, the results on insurance holdings of corporate bonds at issue suggest that, 
conditional on regulatory risk category,  insurance companies have a preference for higher yielding, 
higher risk bonds, i.e., tend to reach for yield. Two possible alternative interpretations should be 
considered: (i) high yields reflect premium for low liquidity and liquidity risk; and that high yields are the 
result of bond-picking ability and market mispricing. We turn to each of these in turn. 
The dependent variable in Tables IV and V is the holdings of insurance companies scaled by the 
total holdings of insurance companies, mutual funds and pension funds. The variable could be sensitive to 
shifts in the relative demand by these investor categories, e.g. due to fund flows or the ability to lever up 
in response to investment. For example, if insurance companies have the ability to raise funds in response 
to investment opportunities they might invest (relatively) more at times when yields are high. Mutual 
funds and pension funds have little to no leverage, so it is unlikely that they can time the market in this 
way. This also appears to be the case for the insurance industry.  
Figure 5 shows the capital structure of U.S. insurance companies. In total, over 70% of insurance 
companies’ liabilities are composed of the obligations generated by underwriting. Long-term debt 
represents 5% and short-term debt only 1% of liabilities. The minimal amount of debt indicates that time-
varying investment patterns by insurance companies, as compared to mutual funds and pension funds, 
cannot be explained by fluctuation in capital structure.  
[FIGURE 5] 
B.  Benchmark results: Secondary market trading 
Most of the investment activity in fixed income occurs at issuance.  However, there is a 
secondary market in corporate bonds. If our hypotheses are correct, then reaching-for-yield should also 
manifest itself in secondary market trading. There are several additional advantages to looking at  
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secondary market trading. Because we can follow a bond over time, it allows us to rule out cross-sectional 
differences in characteristics. Furthermore, since illiquid bonds are rarely traded, and since we can control 
for better liquidity measures, reaching in the secondary market (controlling for liquidity measures) is 
unlikely to reflect a liquidity premium. We also no longer look at the insurance firms’ investment 
decisions as compared to other institutional investors, but instead explore their preference for the same 
bond as its market-assessed risk profile evolves.  
To test reaching-for-yield in the secondary market, we look at how the holdings of insurance 
companies change between successive quarters. The sample is now a panel (bond times quarter), as 
opposed to a cross-section. We use yields to maturity on the over-the-counter secondary market 
transactions reported in TRACE. The results are reported in Table VI.  The dependent variable is the log 
quarterly change in the value of all insurance companies’ holdings of a bond. (Maturing bonds are 
excluded). In order to control for time-invariant and time-varying issuer characteristics we include firm-
times-quarter fixed effects. We also include controls for key time-varying bond characteristics: duration 
and liquidity. We include two measures of liquidity: the log of total transaction volumes relative to 
outstanding par value in the preceding quarter (based on TRACE), and the log of the number of investors 
reporting changed positions in the bond over the preceding quarter (based on eMAXX). Note however 
that the analysis includes firm-times-quarter fixed effects, controls for liquidity pick up within firm-
quarter variation in liquidity, which may not be important. 
[TABLE VI] 
The economic and statistical significance of the benchmark result, Table VI specification (1), 
indicates that insurance companies buy more (or sell less) of outstanding bonds that have a higher yield. 
A one hundred basis point increase in a bond’s yield corresponds to a predicted increase in insurance 
acquisitions in the secondary markets of 4% of insurance holdings. This is consistent with findings at 
issue: insurance companies systematically buy high yield corporate bonds (within investment grade).  
We find that the reaching-for-yield result is specific to the pre-crisis period. As mentioned earlier, 
the time variation in reaching-for-yield is important for the interpretation of our results. In Table VII, we  
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extent the benchmark specification to include quarter dummies interacted with the yield to maturity.  
These time-varying coefficient estimates can capture the evolution of reaching behavior over time. Since 
there are relatively few new issues in some quarters, these coefficients may be hard to estimate precisely. 
Nevertheless, we find a consistent pattern in the quarter-by-quarter results. The coefficients indicate 
pronounced cyclicality in reaching-for-yield. We find consistently positive coefficients for the pre-crisis 
period, mixed signs during the crisis (as defined by the NBER recession indicator), and again positive 
coefficients after the crisis has abated.
25   
[TABLE VII] 
Based on the framework presented in Section 2, these regression results are consistent with 
reaching-for-yield driven by regulatory capital requirement. The return of positive slope estimates in the 
short post-crisis period we have in our data suggests that reaching was not unique to the 2004-2007 
period, but may in fact be a pattern that appears repeatedly during economic expansions. Because the 
post-crisis sample is short, this is a tentative conclusion. 
C.  Insurance firms’ portfolio returns 
We find that insurance companies systematically prefer high yielding investment grade bonds, 
compared to other investors (pension funds and mutual funds). We argue these higher yields may reflect 
risk. But higher yields can also be the sign of bond underpricing. Could it be that the higher yield on 
bonds held by insurance companies are just a reflection of their superior bond-picking or just better access 
to underpriced bonds?  There are several reasons why this alternative interpretation is weak. First, we 
observe no reaching-for-yield in speculative grade bonds. The absence of reaching-for-yield in 
speculative grade is hard to reconcile with a general ability to identify underpriced bonds. Second, the 
reaching-for-yield that we document prior to the crisis disappears during the economic downturn. This 
                                                      
 
25 Notably, the drop in coefficient in 2005:Q2 coincides with the downgrade of GM and Ford to junk, an important 
shock to the bond market.   
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observation appears inconsistent with investment ability as an explanation of reaching-for-yield; it seems 
unlikely that bond underpricing disappeared in the crisis, since there were massive falls in bond prices 
generally at that time.  
That said, we now address the hypothesis of superior investment ability directly by evaluating 
bond performance. We focus on investment grade bonds issued between 2004 and 2007, the period when 
we observe reaching-for-yield. Each month, all newly issued bonds are sorted based on the fraction 
acquired by insurance companies (relative to mutual funds and pension funds). Bonds are then divided 
into two portfolios, above and below the median insurance share (“high insurance holdings” and “low 
insurance holdings”.) Using coupon yield from Mergent FISD and end-of-the-month transaction prices 
from TRACE, we calculate equal-weighted monthly returns on bonds acquired within 1-year. On average, 
the excess return is negative for the portfolio with high insurance holdings and positive for the low 
insurance holdings portfolio (the difference is not statistically significant at the conventional levels). The 
standard deviation of excess returns is higher for the high insurance holdings portfolio (157 bps) than for 
the low insurance holdings portfolio (86 bps). An F-test rejects that the two standard deviations are 
similar at the 1% significance level.
26 We next turn to exposure to risk factors. Tests factor loadings for 
the two portfolios are reported in Table VIII.  
[TABLE VIII] 
Results in Table VIII column (1) and (4) confirm that in a CAPM setting, insurance companies’ 
investment choices generate risky returns: the beta is significantly positive only for the portfolio of bonds 
with high insurance holdings. In columns (2) and (5) we add the two bond market factors: default and 
term premium.
27 In columns (3) and (6) we include the Pastor Stambaugh (2003) liquidity factor, which 
                                                      
 
26 In unreported results, we have varied the methodology for these tests. The findings are robust to using 24-month 
holding periods, including the Fama French SMB and HML factors (which neither portfolio loads on), using value 
weighted returns instead of equal weighted, and allowing for first order serially correlated errors. Including 2008 
returns raises the beta estimate for both portfolios (to 0.51 and 0.29, respectively). 
27 This factor model is based on Bessembinder, Kahle, Maxwell and Xu (2009).  
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neither portfolio loads on. Together, these regression results do not suggest any superior bond-picking 
ability (“ability to generate alpha”) of insurance companies. When controlling for default premium and 
term spread, we can reject a non-negative alpha for the high insurance holdings portfolio at the 10% level. 
Regardless of model, the portfolio with low insurance holdings has an intercept close to zero. In view of 
these tests, higher yields on the bonds that are preferred by insurance firms reflect market risk, but not 
ability. 
D.  Insurance firms’ characteristics 
To further understand the main drivers of reaching-for-yield, we now turn to individual insurance 
firms’ investment decisions. Specifically, we want to test how reaching-for-yield relates to regulatory 
capital constraints, public listing status, corporate governance, and financial leverage.  If some firms reach 
for yield in order to increase the amount of risk in their bond portfolio relative to the regulatory capital 
required, we would expect portfolio yields to be higher among firms with lower cushions of regulatory 
(risk adjusted) capital. If risk-shifting is the driver behind reaching for yield, we would expect portfolio 
yields to be higher among firms with higher financial leverage. If reaching for yield is a reflection of 
agency problems, we would expect firms with better corporate governance to have lower portfolio yields.  
Table IX reports results from panel regressions of insurance companies’ corporate bond 
purchases at issue for each year from 2004-2007.  To capture reaching for yield, we use the average yield 
within a capital regulation category. The dependent variable is the equal-weighted average treasury spread 
of acquired bonds in NAIC 1 and 2. Due to lack of data on regulatory capital, we lose several 
observations, including the majority of private firms. There are 107 parent companies with regulatory 
capital data for at least one year, of which 85 are public.
28  
                                                      
 
28 In unreported regressions, we have used average promised yield to maturity across bonds and the issuer’s CDS 
spread as dependent variables. The results are similar. We have also used value-weighted results, with similar results 
(in some cases, a few bonds dominate the value of a portfolio).  
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The explanatory variables of interest are (1) regulatory capital surplus, i.e. the difference between 
regulatory capital and required regulatory capital normalized by book assets, and (2) the fraction of shares 
held in large blocks
29. Unlike other measures of governance, the share of block holders changes over time. 
These variables can tell us if low regulatory capital and/or weak corporate governance predicts high 
yields in the investment grade bond portfolio across insurance companies.  The capital surplus ratio 
ranges from 1.1% to 61.4%, with an average of 15.2% and standard deviation of 10.0%. Total ownership 
in block holdings ranges from zero to 71.5% (the number of individual blocks ranges from zero to six). 
Average ownership in blocks is 17.5%, and the standard deviation is 15.9%. 
[TABLE IX] 
In column (1), we report a simple regression of the average treasury spread of investment grade 
bonds acquired on regulatory capital surplus. The coefficient is negative and significant. A one standard 
deviation decrease in the capital surplus (10%) corresponds to a 5 basis points increase in the spread of an 
insurance company’s bond portfolio. This is one-third of the cross-firm standard deviation of yield 
spreads. The results are consistent with the regulation hypothesis: firms with lower capital surplus are 
more likely to reach for yield. This is also consistent with the finding of Ellul, Jotikasthira and Lundblad 
(2011) that more capital-constrained insurance firms tend to participate in fire sales around bond 
downgrades, likely reflecting an attempt to avoid higher capital requirements. 
In column (2) we control for whether a firm is publicly traded, to examine whether such firms 
reach for yield due to the incentives generated by reporting and earnings management, as well as leverage 
and size. The coefficient estimate on the public status indicator is insignificant, suggesting reaching for 
yield is not more pronounced among publicly traded firms. Thus, quarterly earnings pressure is not likely 
the main driver of reaching behavior.  Highly levered firms do not appear to buy higher yielding bonds. 
This suggests that risk shifting in the Jensen and Meckling (1976) sense may not be the driver of reaching 
                                                      
 




30  Also, column (2) documents that large firms do reach for yield more. This is 
important econometrically because of the correlation between size and regulatory capital (small firms 
tend to have bigger capital cushions). The regulatory capital result remains significant in this regression. 
In column (3), we examine the effect of having large block-holders who can provide active 
monitoring of a firm. The sample size is smaller, because we only have governance data for public firms. 
The coefficient estimate for block holdings is negative and significant, suggesting that strong owners 
reduce reaching.
31 An additional 16% held in blocks (a standard deviation) is associated with a 4.5 basis 
points increase in portfolio yields, similar to the magnitude associated with capital surplus. We interpret 
this as consistent with the hypothesis that private contracting frictions can drive reaching for yield. In 
column (4), we include the set of control variables (the public status indicator drops out since we only 
have governance data for public firms). Again, the coefficient on size is positive and significant at the 
10% level. Leverage does not appear associated with higher bond yields. 
We run a horse race between the two key variables in column (5), including the control variables. 
Both coefficients of interest are negative and significant, although less so (p-values of 6% and 7%, 
respectively), partially due to co-linearity (the correlation coefficient for the two variables is 0.38). 
Holding leverage fixed, the yield difference between a firm at the 75
th percentile of both capital and block 
ownership, and one at the 25
th percentile of both, is 19 basis points, roughly a fifth of the median yield 
spread. Overall, the cross-sectional findings provide support for both risk preference and weak incentives: 
firms with both aggressive capital management and weak governance take on much more risk. 
 
                                                      
 
30 Because insurance companies do not use much leverage (apart from policy-related liabilities), this may not be the 
right setting for testing the general relevance of risk shifting vis-à-vis debt investors. 
31 Block holders may also be less diversified than dispersed owners, therefore being more reluctant for the firm to 
take on idiosyncratic risk. This would also explain firms with block owners being less risky. However, since we find 
that much of the risk taken on is systematic (see Table VII above), this may not be an important distinction 
(undiversified owners have no reason to be more averse to systematic risk).  
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4.  Implications of Reaching for Yield  
We now turn to an assessment of the welfare consequences of reaching-for-yield. As we had 
shown, reaching-for-yield has a pronounced pro-cyclical pattern, being at its strongest during the peak of 
the credit boom and disappearing in the second half of 2007.  Understanding the connection between 
reaching-for-yield and the business cycle is an important question. In what follows, we provide partial 
evidence for two channels through which reaching-for-yield could have broader implication for the 
economy: first, concentration of systemic risk in the insurance firms’ portfolios; and, second, the potential 
effect on the allocation of credit supply. 
 
A.  Direct implications: Insurance company exposure to systemic risk 
In Table VIII we had shown that, when reaching for yield, insurance companies select bonds with 
higher systemic risk (higher beta). This is consistent with Iannotta and Pennacchi’s (2012),  Gurrieri and 
Kondor (2012), and Frazzini and Pedersen’s (2011) models. In this section we extend this result by 
looking at the overall insurance firms’ performance. Indeed, the 2008 financial crisis involved 
considerable losses for many insurance companies. Three companies (AIG, Hartford Financial Services 
and Lincoln National) received government support under the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), 
and one (AIG) was partially taken over by the Federal Reserve in September 2008. If reaching for yield 
reflects higher risk taking, in a cross-section, we might expect bigger losses of equity value for insurance 
companies that had reached more in their bond portfolios.  This appears to be the case. In Figure 6, we 
plot the stock returns of public insurance companies for the nine months June 2008 to February 2009 
against the average spread of the same companies NAIC 1 bonds. The returns range from -99% (AIG) to 
38% (Industrial Alliance Insurance and Financial Services). As predicted, there is a strong negative 
relation between crisis stock performance and the amount of reaching for yield. 
[FIGURE 6] 
In Table X, we examine crisis returns in a multivariate setting. The specification in column (1) 
replicates the pattern observed in Figure 6, and shows that the negative relation between pre-crisis  
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reaching and crisis returns is statistically significant. For a standard deviation increase in bond spreads(18 
basis points), a firm is predicted to have lost 14.6% more equity value in the crisis (half of the cross-firm 
standard deviation of crisis returns). In column (2), we use the average pre-crisis offering yield instead of 
the yield spread, with similar results (the standard deviation for yields is higher, implying that the 
economic magnitude is slightly larger).  
[TABLE X] 
In columns (2) and (3), we replicate the result for excess returns, defined as the raw return minus 
equity beta multiplied by -47.5% (the market’s return in the period). This is likely over-controlling since 
higher risk in an insurance company’s investment portfolio could affect its systematic risk (beta). The 
results indicate that reaching is additionally associated with negative excess returns. In other words, the 
insurers with most reaching for yield showed negative returns even beyond what their systematic risk 
would have predicted. In columns (5) and (6) we use raw returns as dependent variable, and allow for the 
coefficient on beta to be statistically determined. We also include controls for stock price volatility and a 
TARP recipient (AIG, Hartford Financial Services, Lincoln National) indicator. The negative correlation 
remains. 
The negative returns during the crisis that we document for firms more engaged in reaching for 
yield can represent not only losses on the riskier bond portfolios but also losses due to  higher risk choices 
elsewhere (e.g., reaching for yield in structured products). In either case, the results suggest that reaching 
for yield is not innocuous in terms of the ultimate risks taken on by insurance companies. 
B.  Indirect implications: Corporate bond issuance 
Because insurance companies are large participants in the corporate bond market, reaching for 
yield may generate a shift in the supply of credit to individual firms. Whether such a shift will manifest in 
the price or quantity of credit presumably depends on the demand elasticity of issuers. If issuers change  
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issuance to respond to supply conditions, the response may be more visible in quantities than in yield 
spreads.
32 We therefore focus on volumes. To examine this, we sort all NAIC 2 corporate bond issuers 
(i.e., firms that previously issued a bond) into quartiles based on their previous quarter CDS spreads. We 
then calculate the share of bond issuance, by number or by value, within NAIC 2 (we use this category as 
there is more consistent issuance in NAIC 2 than NAIC 1 throughout our sample period), which is done 
by issuers in the top half of CDS spreads. We compare this to the time series of insurance companies’ 
reaching for yield, as identified in Table VII. This time series are depicted in Figure 7. 
[FIGURE 7] 
The pattern in Figure 7 shows a positive association between high CDS firm’s issue share and 
insurance reaching for yield. The correlation between reaching and the high CDS share is 0.24 (amount) 
and 0.37 (number), statistically significant at the 10% level. This indicates that high yield issuers within 
the BBB rating category issue more (relative to low yield issuers in the same rating category) at times 
when insurance companies reach for yield. These correlations are based on few observations and reflect a 
period of upheaval in credit markets, so they should be interpreted as suggestive only. Taken as such, the 
time series pattern is consistent with an issuance response by corporations. In other words, the flow of 
corporate credit appears to be affected by reaching for yield. 
5.  Conclusions 
It has been argued that reaching-for-yield—investors’ propensity to buy riskier bonds in order to 
achieve higher yields—may have been an important driver behind the dislocations in the credit market 
during financial booms, such as 2004-2007. How reaching-for-yield works and where it manifests is not 
well understood. In this paper, we examine reaching-for-yield in the corporate bond market by looking 
among insurance companies, the largest institutional investor in this market. Insurance companies have 
                                                      
 
32 There is prior evidence that corporate bond issuers are willing and able to adjust issuance to market conditions 
(Kashyap, Stein and Wilcox, 1993; Becker and Ivashina, 2011).  
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capital requirements tied to the credit ratings of their investments. We show that, conditional on ratings, 
insurance portfolios are systematically biased toward higher yield, higher CDS bonds. This result holds 
both at issue and in the secondary market.  
We address several alternative interpretations of our findings. One concern is that high yield is 
correlated with some bond characteristics that might be attractive to insurance companies for other 
reasons. Such explanations would have to fit the time series variation we document in reaching-for-yield. 
Furthermore, when looking at secondary market trading, we follow a bond over time, thus ruling out any 
cross-sectional differences in characteristics. Another concern is that insurance companies might have the 
ability to make superior investments in fixed income (“generate alpha”). If high yield bonds are 
underpriced on average, this investment ability would result in portfolios tilted toward higher yielding 
bonds. However, we implement a direct test of portfolio “alphas” and show that, as a group, insurance 
companies that reach for yield do not generate higher performance, but do appear to hold riskier bonds. 
We provide some evidence on the drivers of reaching for yield, suggesting that low regulatory 
capital and weak corporate governance are associated with more aggressive reaching. We conclude that 
regulation as well as private contracting frictions can drive this behavior. 
 It is commonly believed that reaching for yield contributes to the cyclicality of credit supply and, 
therefore, to the real economic cycle. Consistent with this statement, we find that reaching-for-yield is 
pro-cyclical, disappearing in the second half of 2007 and coming back in 2009. We further provide 
evidence for two channels through which reaching-for-yield appears to affect the broader economy.   
Specifically, periods of reaching for yield by insurance companies appear to lead to higher issuance of 
risky assets by corporations.  
We also show that insurance firms tend to buy bonds with higher systemic risk.  In addition, from 
the portfolio prospective, insurance firms that had the highest tendency to reach for yield in the period 
preceding 2007-2008 financial crisis had performed the worst in the recession period. Although insurance 
firms appear to be less sensitive to runs than banks, as banks, they have liabilities to a broad population 
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Insurance Company Holdings of Newly Issued Bonds 
This figure plots the fraction of newly issued bonds acquired by insurance companies between 2004:Q2-2007:Q2, 
sorted by NAIC risk categories (Panel A), promised yields and CDS spreads (Panel B). The fraction of holdings is 
computed with respect to the total dollar holdings by insurance companies, pension and mutual funds. We report 
equally-weighted averages across bonds. Bars correspond to 95% confidence intervals (based on the standard 
deviation across individual bonds). In panel A, bonds are sorted by NAIC categories (except NAIC 6 which has few 
issues).In Panel B, investment grade bonds (NAIC 1 and 2) are sorted into quartiles of offering yield or CDS Spread. 
 















































































































































































NAIC 1 ($83 billion, 1640 issues total)
NAIC 2 ($69 billion, 827 issues total)
NAIC 3 ($21 billion, 492 issues total)
NAIC 4 ($18 billion, 406 issues total)
NAIC 5 ($7 billion, 201 issues total)




Reaching for Yield 
This figure compares the value-weighted average yield on NAIC category 1 (rating A- up to AAA) corporate bonds 
acquired by insurance companies, mutual funds, and pension funds. Bars indicate 95% confidence intervals for the 
average, based on cross-sectional variation. For pension and mutual funds, we report differences as compared to 
insurance companies and standard errors (in brackets). ***, * indicate statistical significance at   1% and 10% level, 
respectively. 
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Insurance Companies’ Capital Structure 
The figure presents capital structure detail for U.S. insurance companies with more than $100 million 



































Insurance Companies’ Stock Price Performance During Financial Crisis 
The figure presents stock returns for the period June 2008- February 2009 relative to their bond investment choices 
pre-crisis. Spread is the value-weighted average spread of NAIC1 (AAA-A) corporate bonds acquired in the 
2004:Q3-2007:Q2 period. The figure was compiled using CRSP data on sock returns, holdings data from eMAXX 
and yield data from MergentFISD. The picture displays tickers for 16 largest firms in out sample based on 2004 








Reaching for Yield and Bond Issuance 
The figure presents insurance companies’ preference for high yielding bonds (bars, right axis) and the relative bond 
issuance of high CDS corporates (lines, left axis) within NAIC 2, i.e. ratings between BBB- and BBB+. The 
insurance preference is based on quarterly coefficients in Table VII. The time series of bond issuance reports the 
fraction of bonds issued by firms in the top half of issuers based on their CDS spread. The cutoff for CDS spreads is 






























































































































































































Reaching for Yield (secondary axis)
Bond issuance, Dollar volume (NAIC 2)





This figure is based on U.S. Flow of Funds Accounts. The numbers are in billions of U.S. dollars and correspond to amounts outstanding as of the end of 







companies    Mutual funds   
Private pension 
funds  
Total financial assets  5,176.8  1,403.4  7,963.4  6,079.6 
Treasury  securities  161.6  (3%)  91.4 (7%)  296.0 (4%)  486.7 (8%) 
Corporate and foreign bonds  2,022.7  (39%)  299.2  (21%)  1,255.0  (16%)  482.5  (8%) 
Agency- and GSE-backed securities  357.0  (7%)  109.4  (8%)  786.7  (10%)  170.9  (3%) 
Mortgages 318.0  (6%)  4.1  (0%)  --  15.1  (0%) 
Municipal securities and loans  77.5  (1%)  369.8  (26%)  525.9  (7%)   -- 
Corporate  equities  1,423.2  (27%)  228.0 (16%)  4,801.4 (60%)  1,983.3 (33%) 
Mutual fund shares  183.8  (4%)  32.1  (2%)   --  2,228.2  (37%) 
                






NAIC Risk-Based Capital Requirement 
This summarizes National Association of Insurance Companies (NAIC) post-tax capital requirement factors (NAIC Risk-Based Capital Newsletter, 10/12/2001).  
Default rates are from Fitch Ratings Global Corporate Finance 2010 Transition and Default Study.  
 
NAIC categories  Credit ratings    Capital charge  5-year cumulative default rates 
(1990-2010) 
Federal government      Exempt   
NAIC 1 (highest)  AAA, AA, A  Investment Grade  0.3%  0.00%, 0.09%, 0.69% 
NAIC 2   BBB  Investment Grade  0.96%  2.62% 
NAIC 3   BB  High Yield/Speculative Grade  3.39%  6.76% 
NAIC 4   B  High Yield/Speculative Grade  7.38%  8.99% 
NAIC 5   CCC  High Yield/Speculative Grade  16.96%  34.38% 
NAIC 6 (lowest)  CC or below  High Yield/Speculative Grade  19.50%   
 




Bond and Issuer Characteristics across CDS Quartiles of Investment Grade Issuers 
This table presents the median of selected issuer and bond characteristics throughout the sample period, for 
investment grade issuers. The characteristics are at bond issuance. Each entry reports the median and, in parenthesis, 
the standard deviation of a characteristic. For credit ratings, the standard deviation is in notches (the difference 
between A and A- is one notch). 







































































         
        
        
        









Reaching for Yield: Yield to Maturity  
We look at the investment decision immediately following bond issuance. With the exception of specification (4), the sample is composed of investment grade 
issues (NAIC Categories 1 and 2). Specification (4) corresponds to non-investment/speculative grade. Treasury spread is the yield difference between a bond and 
a maturity-matched treasury bond. Duration is computed using bond information from Mergent FISD. Credit ratings fixed effects are AAA, AA+, AA, AA-, etc.. 
Standard errors clustered by issuer and are reported in brackets. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at   1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Dependent variable: 
Insurance companies’ holding as a fraction of insurance, mutual and pension funds  
holding amount 
 Benchmark    Crisis 
 (2004:Q3-2007:Q2)    (2007:Q3-2010:Q4) 
 Investment  grade    Speculative    Investment grade 
   (1)  (2)  (3)    (4)    (5) (6) (7) 
                        
Treasury spread  0.055*  0.067***  0.047**    0.018    -0.028 -0.042**  -0.038** 
[0.029]  [0.023] [0.018]   [0.019]    [0.018] [0.017]  [0.017] 
NAIC Category 2 (BBB+, BBB, BBB-)  -0.003  -0.010  --   --    -0.049 0.014  -- 
 [0.050]  [0.022]          [0.062] [0.036]   
Duration (years)  --  0.009** 0.008**   0.007    --  0.000 0.001 
[0.003] [0.003]   [0.010]    [0.005] [0.005] 
Offering amount  --  -0.025*** -0.021***  -0.072***    --  -0.056*** -0.058*** 
[0.003] [0.004]   [0.012]    [0.006] [0.007] 
                
Fixed  effects:                
  Rating * Year (interacted)  No No  Yes   Yes    No No  Yes 
                
Observations  589  589 589   188    325 325  325 
Clusters  (issuers)  141  141 138   78    93 93  91 










Reaching for Yield: CDS Spread 
We look at the investment decision immediately following bond issuance. With the exception of specification (4), the sample is composed of investment grade 
issues (NAIC Categories 1 and 2). Specification (4) corresponds to non-investment/speculative grade. Duration is computed using bond information from 
MergentFISD. Credit ratings fixed effects are AAA, AA+, AA, AA-, etc.. Standard errors clustered by issuer and are reported in brackets. ***, **, * indicate 
statistical significance at   1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Dependent variable: 
Insurance companies’ holding as a fraction of insurance, mutual and pension funds  
holding amount 
 Benchmark    Crisis 
 (2004:Q3-2007:Q2)    (2007:Q3-2010:Q4) 
 Investment  grade    Speculative    Investment grade 
   (1)  (2)  (3)    (4)    (5) (6)  (7) 
      
CDS spread  0.060**  0.049*  0.003    -0.038    -0.058 -0.110***  -0.113*** 
[0.028]  [0.030] [0.002]   [0.045]    [0.054] [0.021]  [0.024] 
NAIC Category 2 (BBB+, BBB, BBB-)  -0.057  -0.045  --   --    -0.052 0.014  -- 
 [0.050]  [0.039]          [0.061] [0.032]   
Duration (years)  --  0.009** 0.005***    0.003    --  0.002 0.004 
[0.004] [0.002]   [0.007]    [0.005] [0.004] 
Offering amount  --  -0.019*** 0.012   -0.046**    --  -0.068*** -0.075*** 
[0.06] [0.023]    [0.018]   [0.008] [0.007] 
                
Fixed  effects:                
  Rating * Year (interacted)  No No  Yes   Yes    No No  Yes 
                
Observations  686  547 547   188    395 325  325 
Clusters  (issuers)  139  126 123   78    106 93  91 






Reaching for Yield: Secondary Market (Trades) 
This table reports results from panel regressions of secondary market activity of insurance companies in investment 
grade corporate bonds. The dependent variable is the log quarterly change in the value of all insurance companies’ 
holdings of a bond (maturing bonds are excluded). Observations where the dependent variable is above 1 are 
excluded. The sample is constrained to investment grade issues (NAIC Categories 1 and 2). Duration is computed 
using bond information from MergentFISD. Trading volume is the log of the value of transactions in TRACE for a 
given bond, divided by total par value outstanding, lagged one quarter. Number of trades is the log of the number of 
investors reporting a changed position in the previous quarter in eMAXX. Standard errors clustered by issuer and 
are reported in brackets. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at   1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Dependent variable: 
Log change in value of insurance companies’ total 






   (1)  (2)  (3) 
           
Yield to maturity  0.036***  0.039***  0.004 
[0.012] [0.013]  [0.004] 
NAIC Category 2 (BBB+, BBB, BBB-)  -0.009*  -0.014**  -0.107 
 [0.005]  [0.005]  [0.068] 
Duration -0.003  -0.004*  0.003** 
 [0.002]  [0.002]  [0.001] 
Trading volume  --  0.004  -0.002 
   [0.004]  [0.005] 
Number of trades  --  -0.005  0.006 
   [0.005]  [0.005] 
      
Fixed effects:       
Firm-quarter Yes  Yes  Yes 
      
Observations 2,040  1,865  1,772 
Clusters (issuers)  36  33  33 





Reaching for Yield: Time Series Variation 
This table reports results from panel regressions of secondary market activity of insurance companies in investment 
grade corporate bonds. The dependent variable is the log quarterly change in the value of all insurance companies’ 
holdings of a bond (maturing bonds are excluded). The sample is constrained to investment grade issues (NAIC 
Categories 1 and 2). The coefficient on yield is allowed to vary by quarter. Standard errors clustered by issuer and 
are reported in a separate column. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at   1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Dependent variable:  Log change in value of insurance companies’ 




Coeff.   Std.  error 
              
Interaction terms (yield*quarter):     
2004:Q2    0.0186   [0.0129] 
2004:Q3    0.0130   [0.0117] 
2004:Q4    0.0348***   [0.0100] 
2005:Q1    0.0161   [0.0107] 
2005:Q2    0.0050   [0.0101] 
2005:Q3    0.0419***   [0.0083] 
2005:Q4    0.0341***   [0.0115] 
2006:Q1    -0.0016   [0.0192] 
2006:Q2    0.0538***   [0.0176] 
2006:Q3    0.0356*   [0.0196] 
2006:Q4    0.0316**   [0.0155] 
2007:Q1    0.0598***   [0.0152] 
















  2007:Q3    -0.0096    [0.0138] 
2007:Q4    0.0059    [0.0051] 
2008:Q1    0.0033    [0.0037] 
2008:Q2    -0.0022    [0.0064] 
2008:Q3    -0.0032    [0.0034] 
2008:Q4    0.0010    [0.0013] 
2009:Q1    0.0002    [0.0014] 
2009:Q2    0.0019    [0.0067] 
2009:Q3    0.0153**   [0.0078] 
2009:Q4    0.0246***   [0.0074] 
2010:Q1    0.0092   [0.0088] 
2010:Q2    0.0139   [0.0092] 
2010:Q3    0.0059   [0.0099] 
          
Firm-quarter fixed effects:    Yes    
          
  Observations    7,948    







This table examines bonds secondary market performance for 2004-2007.  The test focuses on newly issued 
investment grade bonds. The dependent variable is monthly excess return (returns in excess of the risk-free rate) 
measured in basis points. Returns are constructed using prices from non-cancelled transactions reported in TRACE. 
Monthly returns are computed using median trade price at the last day of the month and factor in bond coupons. For 
a given month, the sample includes bonds acquired within 1-year window. We report equally-weighted excess 
returns for the portfolio with the highest (above the median) and lowest (below the median) insurance holdings 
measured at issuance. The risk-free rate and market return are from Ken French's website. The default spread is the 
difference in returns between investment grade and high yield corporate bonds (the Lehman/Barclays index), and the 
term spread is the difference in returns between the five year treasury bond and the three month treasury bill. 
Liquidity is the return factor of Pastor and Stambaugh (2003). ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% 




insurance holdings  
 Low   
insurance holdings 
   (1)  (2)  (3)    (4)  (5)  (6) 
              
Intercept (“Alpha”)  -27.9  -49.2**  -12.7    2.8  -11.8  -1.8 
 [22.8]  [21.9]  [27.6]    [5.2]  [15.8]  [14.8] 
Stock market excess return  0.17**  0.21***  0.17**    0.03  0.08*  0.03 
[0.08] [0.08]  [0.07]    [0.05] [0.04]  [0.05] 
Default premium  --  0.51*  --    --  0.12**  -- 
   [0.30]        [0.06]   
Term spread  --  0.36***  --    --  0.35***  -- 
   [0.08]        [0.04]   
Liquidity factor  --  --  0.14    --  --  0.04 
     [0.09]        [0.06] 
              
Observations 48  48  48    48  48  48 
R-squared 0.07  0.41  0.13    0.01  0.67  0.02 
             
Mean excess return  -17.4      4.5   




Governance and Reaching for Yield 
This table reports results from cross-sectional regressions of purchases of insurance companies of NAIC 1 and 2 
(i.e., investment grade) corporate bonds. We look at purchases at bond issue for the period 20034-2007. The 
dependent variable, Treasury spread, is the difference between the average promised yield-to-maturity on bonds 
acquired by a given insurance company and a maturity-matched treasury bond in each year. Regulatory capital 
surplus is capital surplus normalized by assets. Block-holder ownership measures the fraction of outstanding shares 
held by block-holders. Public firm is a dummy indicating whether the firm is publically traded. Leverage is the ratio 
of liabilities to equity, and is capped at 20. Size is the log of assets (book value). Robust standard errors, clustered by 
firm, are reported in brackets. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at   1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 
 
Dependent variable:  Treasury spread 
   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Insurance companies characteristics:       
       
Regulatory capital surplus   -0.512***  -0.394***  -- -- -0.683* 
[0.118]  [0.130]    [0.373] 
Block-holder ownership  --  -  -0.348*** -0.328*** -0.286* 
      [0.120] [0.119] [0.147] 
Public firm  -- 4.83  -- -- -- 
   [3.75]     
Leverage  -- -0.061  -- 0.059  -0.443 
   [0.129]   [0.665]  [0.846] 
Size  -- 1.43**  -- 2.21*  1.19 
   [0.731]   [1.32]  [1.50] 
       
Observations  578 572 286 286 286 
R-squared  0.13 0.17 0.08 0.15 0.20 
 




Reaching for Yield and Insurance Companies’ Performance  
This table reports results from regressing insurance companies’ stock returns during the financial crisis (June 2008 
to February 2009) on their pre-crisis portfolio choices. Each observation in the analysis corresponds to a different 
insurance firm (this is a pure cross-section). In columns (1), (2), (5) and (6), the dependent variable is the raw return; 
in columns (3) and (4), the dependent variable is the excess return calculated using a market model with betas 
estimated based on 2002-2010 data.  NAIC 1 corporate bonds issued during the period 2004:Q3-2007:Q2. Average 
Treasury Spread and Average Offering Spread are the value-weighted average spreads for bonds acquired by a 
given insurance company at their issuance. TARP recipient indicates three insurance companies that received 
support under the Federal Reserves Troubled Asset Relief Program in the fall of 2008. Stock Beta and Stock 
Volatility are estimated using daily data for 2001-2011 period.  Robust standard errors are reported in brackets. ***, 
**, * indicate statistical significance at   1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Dependent variable:  Return   Excess  return   Return 
   (1) (2)   (3)  (4)   (5)  (6) 
Insurance companies:               
             
Average Treasury Spread  -0.824*** --   -0.359*  --   -0.399**  -- 
[0.191]    [0.188]     [0.184]   
Average Offering Spread  -- -0.423***   --  -0.222**   --  -0.183* 
   [0.088]     [0.100]     [0.099] 
TARP recipient   -- --  --  --   -0.058  -0.059 
          [0.068]  [0.073] 
Stock Beta  -- --  --  --   -0.114  -0.146* 
          [0.070]  [0.075] 
Stock Volatility  -- --  --  --   -4.76***  -4.50*** 
          [1.435]  [1.601] 
             
Observations  67 67  67  67   67  67 










In the empirical tests, we aim to examine (a) the existence of reaching-for-yield, and (b) how it 
depends on macroeconomic conditions. 
A portfolio manager that is reaching-for-yield will always pick the highest yielding security for a 
given risk benchmark (assuming there are no costs to doing this.) For an investor whose risk is evaluated 
exclusively using credit ratings, bonds with higher yield within a rating appear more attractive, regardless 
of their actual risk. In the extreme, a manager would want to allocate a whole portfolio to the single 
highest-yielding asset. However, for a forward-looking manager and in the presence of ratings changes, 
the allocation decision is more intricate. In this dynamic setting, the portfolio decision balances expected 
yield against the risk of being downgraded (for insurance companies, this raises future capital 
requirements). To fix ideas, we formalize the investment decisions of a portfolio manager in a simple 
two-period, two-asset model: 
Consider a portfolio manager deciding to allocate $1 between two securities. The manager invests 
an amount    in security  . The manager works for a principal who dislikes risk; this could be a regulator 
or an ultimate investor who has delegated the portfolio decision. The principal and manager agree that the 
promised return of asset   is      . Securities are assigned ratings, which can be   or  , where    reflects a 
safer asset, by a third party. Both securities have an A rating, but asset 1 has a lower yield:       	      .  
Case 1: Consider the case where the principal imposes no penalties and where the manager gets a 
linear contract based on returns. In this scenario, the manager maximizes her expected utility         
      for the linear sharing rule   ,  . As long as   is positive, it is optimal for the manager to simply 
maximize     : 
max    ,   ∑            ,    . .∑       1   (1) 
The optimum is a corner solution, where the manager puts the whole portfolio in the security offering the 
highest return (second security). This manager favors high yielding securities even if they are riskier, 
because there is no cost associated with it.   
 
 
Case 2: We now allow for capital requirements or, more broadly, penalties based on ratings. 
Penalties are    and          ∆ 	       for assets rated   and  , respectively. Penalties are assessed in 
period two at which point the initial rating may have changed (recall, both assets are assigned rating A at 
the start). The probability of a downgrade from   to   is    ∈  0,1 , so that the expected capital 
requirement for the (initial)   securities is  1    
         
             
 Δ. We assume that the higher 
yielding security is more likely to be downgraded, so that    
   	   
 . In this setting the investor solves the 
following problem: 
max    ,   ∑   	                 
 Δ              
 Δ    ,    . .∑       1  
or 
 
max    ,   ∑               
 Δ    ,    . .∑       1   (2) 
Due to the linearity of this problem, the manager will again concentrate his portfolio in a single asset. 
From the first order conditions we conclude that asset 1 is preferred to asset 2 (i.e., the marginal utility of 
investing in asset 1 is higher) if       	       Δ    
      
  . In other words, the manager favors the higher 
yielding security if its excess return outweighs its higher probability of a downgrade. For certain values of 
the parameters the manager will reach for yield: first, when the ratings-based penalty (Δ) is large, 
reaching-for-yield is less attractive. Second, when the risk of downgrades    
   is higher (for the higher 
yielding security), the reaching behavior becomes weaker.  
We have abstracted from the risk aversion of the manager, and the choice of penalties by the 
principal. It is also outside of the scope why some principals use penalties as we model them here (e.g., 
regulatory capital requirements), while others use absolute quantitative rules (e.g., some mutual funds 
invest exclusively in investment grade bonds).  
The conclusion that higher downgrade probabilities weaken the incentive to reach for yield has a 
straightforward, testable prediction: any bond that faces a higher downgrade probability is less attractive 
for a manager reaching-for-yield. For insurance companies, both the cost of a downgrade and the 
probability of a downgrade are increasing in measurable risk (NAIC categories). As discussed earlier,  
 
 
capital requirements are convex in NAIC risk categories. In addition, as illustrated in Figure A.1, Panel A 
the probability of a downgrade is also convex in NAIC risk category. Probability of NAIC 2 asset in the 
highest CDS quartile to be downgraded is 9%. However, probability of NAIC 3 asset in the highest CDS 
quartile to be downgraded is 12%. For the lowest CDS quartile, the corresponding probabilities are only 
0% and 1%. To avoid raising capital, insurance companies could sell its bonds when it is downgraded, but 
such a strategy has a non-trivial economic cost (e.g., Ellul, Jotikasthria and Lundblad, 2011; Bao, Pan, 
and Wang, 2011). There is also an additional source of convexity given that highly rated bonds are 
cheaper to trade than low-rated bonds. Edwards, Harris and Piwowar (2007) point out that, while the 
difference between investment grade bonds is negligible, high-yield bonds are almost twice as costly to 
trade as investment grade bonds.  What this amounts to is that reaching-for-yield—loading on high CDS 
within rating category—should be less likely in NAIC categories that correspond to speculative grade 
ratings.   
Our sample covers the financial crisis, and we need to consider carefully how that may affect the 
propensity to reach for yield. There are at least two reasons why reaching-for-yield should be less likely 
in the crisis. First, downgrades are cyclical, so all bonds face higher downgrade probabilities. As 
explained above, this should reduce reaching. Second, it may well be that in a period of high risk and high 
risk premia such as the crisis, other reasons to avoid risk dominate regulatory constraints. For example, 
investors may become sufficiently risk averse that they no longer consider capital regulation binding. 




NAIC Quarterly Transition Probability by CDS Quartile 
This figure shows probability of downward (Panel A) and upgrade (Panel B) transition between different NAIC risk 
categories sorted by CDS quartiles. For example, probability of NAIC 2 asset in the highest CDS quartile to be 
downgraded is 9%. However, probability of NAIC 3 asset in the highest CDS quartile to be downgraded is 12%. We 
define downgrade as a change in rating that moves an issuer from one NAIC to any lower NAIC within the quarter 
of issuance.  
A.  Downgrades 
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